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Jordan Stanger-Ross, Christina Collins,
and Mark J. Stern

Falling Far from the Tree
Transitions to Adulthood and the Social History
of Twentieth-Century America

Employing the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series of the University of Minnesota, we chronicle the changing timing and duration of transitions to adulthood in the
twentieth century. Successive generations of young Americans reinvented the transition to adulthood to accommodate shifts in the economy and the American state. The
patterned choices of young people delineate three eras of social history in the twentieth
century: the era of reciprocity (1900–1950), the era of dependence (1950–70s), and
the era of autonomy (1970s-2000). We also explain why African Americans diﬀered
from the general trend; they developed distinctive transitions to adulthood in response
to persistent inequality.

This article proposes a three-part periodization of American private lives
in the twentieth century. The transition to adulthood—when individuals
undertake a cluster of choices about their places within families, workplaces,
and institutions—provides the basis for our argument. We contend that the
synchronized choices of Americans in this life stage delineate three distinct
but connected twentieth-century eras, each era reﬂecting the responses of
young people to changes in the economy and the American state.
Our deﬁnition of the transition to adulthood draws upon the work of
John Modell, Frank Furstenberg, and Theodore Hershberg, as set forth in
their essay ‘‘Social Change and Transitions to Adulthood in Historical PerSocial Science History 29:4 (winter 2005), 625–48
Copyright © 2005 by the Social Science History Association
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spective’’ (1976), which illustrates the relationships among ﬁve choices made
in transition to adulthood: marrying, leaving parents’ homes, establishing
new households, leaving school, and entering the workforce. Together these
choices transport young people from their positions as dependents living in
households headed by other people to economic independence and procreative households of their own.
We are aware of the limits of this deﬁnition. With the exception of ever
having married, the status changes recorded by the census can be reversed;
young people move both ways between the social positions that we take to
reﬂect adulthood and childhood. In addition, an important minority of the
population has always taken other paths, by remaining resident with their
parents, spending their entire life spans outside the workforce, or electing
never to marry. Yet the entry of most young people into conventional adulthood shapes the experiences of those who make other choices. For example,
children in the United States living at home at age 11 have never been thought
to have made alternative choices, but once most young people leave their parents’ houses, staying home becomes a distinct behavior. The timing of this
change in young people’s lives carries ramiﬁcations even for those who depart
from common paths. Furthermore, the great majority of twentieth-century
Americans ultimately did undertake the ﬁve status changes that we measure,
and by doing so they provided the bedrock of social organization. Mass departure from heterosexual procreative households and labor force participation
would have required radical rearrangement of the economy, housing, and
likely governance of the United States. It is worthwhile, therefore, to explore
the ways in which this process has maintained itself—and kept most Americans on paths to a narrowly conceived adulthood—over the past century.
In broad strokes, twentieth-century transitions to adulthood can be
sketched as follows. In the ﬁrst 50 years of the century, young people prolonged the process of becoming adults. Many left school and joined the
workforce as teenagers, but they delayed leaving their parents’ houses and
marrying. Their transitions to adulthood were characterized by the reciprocal reliance of young people on adult households and, in turn, of adulthood households on young people. The transition to adulthood shortened
after the Second World War. Young people delayed the onset of transition
by remaining in school longer than their predecessors, and once they began
the transition to adulthood, they quickly departed from their parents’ houses
to establish their own residences with spouses. In this period, young people
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made decisions about marrying and establishing their own households at
especially young ages, either while they remained dependent upon parents
or very shortly thereafter. Finally, beginning in the mid-1970s, young people
once again lingered in transition to adulthood. They further delayed the end
of school and established transitional households after they left their parents’ houses but before they married. In this era, young people entered the
workforce en masse in their early twenties, but many remained in school
for another half-decade. They were the ﬁrst twentieth-century generation to
make decisions about marriage and establishing procreative households in
positions of relative autonomy from their parents.
Our work is greatly indebted to previous research. In addition to developing the methods we employ, Modell et al. (ibid.) were among the ﬁrst scholars to provide deﬁnitive evidence of the dramatic shortening of the transition
to adulthood in the middle years of the twentieth century (see also Hogan
1981; Stevens 1990). Recent shifts, however, require revision of Modell et al.’s
explanatory framework. In the decades since their research, the middle phase
that they took as deﬁnitive of the century proved an aberration—the era of
rapid transition to adulthood rose and then fell. Our article is the ﬁrst to
apply their approach to data that span the entire century.1 Viewed from 1900
to 2000, the transition to adulthood must be understood and explained in
three related but distinct eras rather than as one continuous trend.
More recently, scholars have incorporated late-twentieth-century shifts
into their studies of the transition to adulthood. Modell’s later work notes the
rise and fall of early marriage, and of the social practices that characterized
the rushed transition to adulthood (Modell 1989). Francis and Calvin Goldscheider’s century-long study of leaving home ﬁnds that the decline in the
age when young people left their parents’ houses reversed in the last decades
of the twentieth century (Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1999). Their ﬁndings, especially when revised by Myron Gutmann, Sara Pullum-Piñón, and
Thomas Pullum’s ‘‘Three Eras of Young Adult Home Leaving in TwentiethCentury America’’ (2002), suggest a periodization of twentieth-century transitions to adulthood that closely accords with the one that we present.2
However, these studies concentrate on one or two emblematic transitional choices, such as marriage or leaving home, rather than the relations
among the various decisions that comprise the transition to adulthood. Great
advantage is gained by using the measures developed by Modell and his colleagues to consider the array of choices involved in the transition to adulthood
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simultaneously. Analysis of the relationships among these choices, as opposed
to separate consideration of each, reﬂects the process of transition to adulthood and comes closer to representing the experiences of young Americans.
Conceiving of the transition to adulthood as a multidimensional life stage
also illuminates its participation in broader historical shifts and energizes
the connection between the transition to adulthood and the wider concerns
and agendas of twentieth-century American historians. The changing relations among the ﬁve choices that comprise the transition to adulthood point
to the inﬂuence of shifting opportunities on personal life and illuminate the
ways in which inequality, especially on racial grounds, has shaped life course
decisions.

Measuring the Transition to Adulthood:
Spread, Congruence, and Integration
Becoming an adult involves a series of choices that are made in relation to
one another as well as in relation to the choices of other people. The decision
to enter the workforce, for example, interacts with other dimensions of the
transition to adulthood: it can require departure from school and may enable
a young person to leave his or her parents’ household. Peers move together
through these linked decisions; young people take note of each other’s movement along multiple dimensions, and their decisions and paths impact one
another. Three measures developed by Modell et al. (1976) capture these
intertwining choices. Spread reﬂects the duration of the entire transition to
adulthood within the life course of a generation of young people, congruence
measures the extent to which diﬀerent dimensions of the transition occurred
simultaneously within a given generation, and integration refers to the likelihood that an individual who went through one status change would have
gone through another.
Spread identiﬁes the years necessary for the central 80 percent of the
population to pass a given status change. It requires ﬁrst that we identify the
age group most likely to attain a given adult status. For example, in 1900,
95.5 percent of all 54-year-old males had married, so this age group sets the
prevalence of marriage among men in 1900. Young men 21 years of age constituted the ﬁrst group that was at least one-tenth as likely as 54-year-old men
to have married, and at age 41, males ﬁrst reached a marriage rate greater
than 90 percent of that set by the benchmark older men. The spread for a
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transition is the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and last years identiﬁed in this
calculation; in the case of marriage for males in 1900, the spread was 20 years.
We report the spread of all ﬁve status changes together in the form of a
combined spread. This measure denotes the time between the age at which
10 percent of the population undertook its ﬁrst status change, usually leaving
school or entering the workforce, and the age when 90 percent passed into
the ﬁnal adult status, which was usually marriage or establishing one’s own
household. In the century’s ﬁrst census, 10 percent of males had left school
by the age of 11—and hence begun the transition to adulthood—but they
delayed the ﬁnal status change, when 90 percent of males had married, until
the age of 41. Accordingly, in 1900 the combined spread of the male transition to adulthood was 30 years. This ﬁgure denotes the duration of the entire
transition to adulthood for a given generation—it reﬂects the number of years
during which most young people were in the midst of decisions that would
shape their adult lives.
Congruence measures the overlap of two status changes during their
spreads; it produces a number between zero, when there is no overlap between two measured status changes, and one, when the two changes overlap
entirely. In the case of marriage and leaving one’s parents’ home for males
in the 1900 census, the two status changes overlapped for 14 years, from the
age of 21 to 34. In total, the two spreads lasted 42 years in 1900, so the congruence coeﬃcient (two times the overlap divided by the sum of the spreads)
for these status changes in that census year is 0.67.3 This ﬁgure indicates the
degree to which people of the same age group were simultaneously in the
midst of diﬀerent aspects of the transition to adulthood. It thereby gauges
whether young people followed age-based sequences of events—for example,
ﬁrst leaving home, then getting a job, then getting married—or whether they
produced a more chaotic picture by jumping various hurdles simultaneously.
Each aspect of the transition to adulthood is tested against all of the others;
we report the mean of the individual ﬁgures as an average congruence.
The third measure, integration, gauges the extent to which an individual’s position for one status change predicts his or her likelihood of having
passed other hurdles in the transition to adulthood. Integration uses the
lambda statistic from cross-tabulation analysis, which produces a number
between zero, when one status fails entirely to predict another, and one, when
one status wholly predicts another. In the case of marriage and leaving parents’ homes, the lambda for males in 1900 was 0.28, indicating that knowing a
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person’s marriage status improved our ability to predict his household status
by about one-quarter, and vice versa.4 Integration connotes similar processes
to those captured in spread and congruence but describes individual, not
group, experience: high levels of integration suggest that individuals had to
move quickly, if not simultaneously, through diﬀerent status changes; lower
levels of integration denote a slower, more sequential approach to the transition to adulthood. We report integration ﬁgures in the form of a median of
the individual pairings.
None of these measures perfectly replicates the experiences of individuals moving through the transition to adulthood. Ideal data would trace the
decisions of individuals over time rather than reporting the distribution of
status changes across the age range at a single moment. This shortcoming
especially hampers analysis of women’s workforce participation. For most of
the century, women joined the workforce in greatest numbers prior to marriage; for the rest of their lives they moved in and out of employment in
accordance with the demands of family life. Their workforce participation
cannot be characterized as a status change en route to adulthood, so we have
eliminated it from our calculations. Despite this weakness, the absence of a
suitable longitudinal data set requires use of cross-sectional data to approximate the actual decisions of young Americans as they aged.5 To this end,
combined spread, average congruence, and median integration prove revealing. They show a great deal of variation over the course of the twentieth century as young people consistently refused to come of age in the fashion of
their predecessors.

Reinventing the Transition to Adulthood:
Evidence of Three Eras
Our three-part periodization of the twentieth century begins in analysis of
combined spreads. Both males and females began the century with prolonged transitions to adulthood; the combined spreads of the early decades of
the century never again reappeared (ﬁgure 1). After midcentury, combined
spreads fell to century-long lows. The drop from the beginning of the century to 1960 and 1970 reduced the number of years available for male decisions by 48 percent, and female spreads fell a stunning 64 percent. The young
people who reached their twenties in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s came of age
in a pressure cooker: their rapid transitions ﬁnd little precedent or parallel
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Figure 1 Combined spread for all males and females, 1900–2000
Source: Data for all ﬁgures are derived from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the
United States (Ruggles and Sobek 2003). The data presented here use the 1 in 100 samples except in 1900
(1 in 760), 1910 (1 in 250), and 1920 (1 in 200). Data for the 1930 census are not available.

at other times in the century. By 1980, an increase in the number of years
taken in the transition to adulthood was already apparent, and by 2000, young
people delayed almost as long in transition to adulthood as they had at the
outset of the century. The era of rapid transition to adulthood rose and then
fell, delineating three distinct periods.
Despite this common pattern, males and females had diﬀerent experiences of the transition to adulthood. Although they began their ﬁrst status
changes at similar ages, commonly leaving school or entering the workforce in
their early to midteens, males and females completed the transition to adulthood at diﬀerent paces. Males consistently delayed marrying and acquiring
their own households for a number of years longer than their female peers.
This discrepancy varied over time but dipped below four years only once,
in 1940 (ﬁgure 1). In all other years, marriages and households comprised
of older males and somewhat younger females facilitated the comparatively
long transition to adulthood by young males.
Average congruence adds depth to this picture and furthers the distinction between male and female experiences. For males, the graph inverts the
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Figure 2 Average congruence for all males and females, 1900–2000
Source: See ﬁgure 1.

trajectory of spreads; levels of congruence are lowest at the outset of the century, rising sharply to a peak of 0.73 in 1970 before falling again by the end
of the century (ﬁgure 2). Although in 1990 and 2000 congruence remained
higher than in the ﬁrst decades of the century, it had fallen well below the
number for any date after 1940. Thus, when males were most rushed in the
transition to adulthood, they also made overlapping status changes; when
they took more time to make the transition, they were more likely, as a group,
to have largely ﬁnished one status change before they began another. Females,
however, show a diﬀerent trend. Average congruence was higher overall for
females than for males, and as the century progressed, female levels of congruence increased. By the last decades of the century, females passed through
the various status changes with great simultaneity while their male counterparts had returned to a signiﬁcantly more sequential approach.
Congruence and spread provide a vision of the social experience of the
transition to adulthood. Young people of diﬀerent generations and genders
would have seen diﬀerent things had they considered the transitions of their
peers. Males in the ﬁrst decades of the century would have seen their peers
taking a slow, ordered approach to the transition to adulthood. Friends and
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acquaintances would have left school and generally found jobs before completing other status changes. At midcentury, the scene was both compressed
and chaotic; a young man reﬂecting on his peers in this era would have seen
them moving quickly through important decisions. Choices likely seemed to
come all at once: just as some friends decided to leave school, others would
have married and bought houses. By the end of the century, a more prolonged
and sequential picture reemerged.
Surveys of female peer groups in transition to adulthood would have
diﬀered, especially with regard to congruence. Like males, females started
with prolonged transitions to adulthood; the period of change shortened at
midcentury but lengthened again at century’s end. However, as the century
progressed, females grew more likely to make decisions of diﬀerent kinds
within the same range of years. Despite prolonging the process at the end of
the century, young women eschewed any particular order in the transition to
adulthood.
Integration illustrates that individual experiences reﬂected group experiences. From the outset of the century to 1940, the correlations among
female status changes rose slowly, while those for males changed very little
(ﬁgure 3). In this period, passing one status change did not compel young
people, especially males, to pass others. Median integration rose rapidly after
midcentury. By 1960 and 1970, integration for males was almost ﬁve times
higher than it had been in 1940, and for females the ﬁgure was almost one
and a half times higher than 20 years prior. For women especially, passing
one status increasingly meant passing others. Finally, the last censuses of the
century saw steady decline in median integration. By the year 2000, young
people once again might try one aspect of the transition to adulthood—by
getting a job or moving away from home—without immediately undertaking
all ﬁve. Like spreads and congruence, integration yields a three-stage periodization of transitions to adulthood.
Although the three measures suggest that ﬁrst and ﬁnal periods resemble
one another, changes in school participation diﬀerentiate early- and latetwentieth-century transitions to adulthood. In 1900, 90 percent of 19-yearold males had left school, but it was not until they reached the age of 41
that similar numbers acquired their own households. Females passed through
their transitions to adulthood in the same fashion. By the age of 20, 90 percent had left school, but they did not acquire their own households at similar
levels until the age of 33. Between these two status changes, young people
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Figure 3 Median integration for all males and females, 1900–2000
Source: See ﬁgure 1.

spent a good deal of time working in other people’s households, often without being counted part of the workforce. In contrast, young people in the
ﬁnal decades of the century remained in school until close to the end of their
transitions to adulthood. For them, all ﬁve of the status changes began at
older and more similar ages, in the late teens and early twenties, and entering the workforce became the ﬁrst and quickest transition. In 2000, 23-yearold males and 22-year-old females already had reached 90 percent of their
peak workforce participation, but they did not leave school in similar numbers until they reached the ages of 29 and 30, respectively. Young people now
spent their transitional years working and studying. They combined these
activities as a cohort, some entering the workforce while others studied, and
as individuals, by working and studying at the same time.
In sum, spread, congruence, and integration provide reliable evidence of
three eras of transition to adulthood. At the beginning of the century, young
people spent an extended period in the midst of transition. As the century
progressed, this prolonged life stage narrowed, creating a pressure-cooker
transition from childhood to adulthood. Finally, as the century ended, young
people once again spent a good deal of time becoming adults.
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Social Historical Categories and the
Transition to Adulthood
In the foregoing analysis, gender alone has been used to diﬀerentiate among
diﬀerent types of young people, but membership in other demographic
groups also made a diﬀerence in the transition to adulthood. The measures
used in this article inhibit consideration of some social categories such as
class and immigration statuses. Because the census provides no indication of
parental occupations or incomes for young people who have left their parents’ homes, no continuous variable could be used to calculate the role of
class in the transition to adulthood. Problems arise in the analysis of immigrants due to the dramatic decline of immigration between 1925 and 1965
and the use of marriage and workforce characteristics as bases for admission
into the United States. However, the combined spreads of groups divided on
two grounds—region and race—provide an indication of both the breadth
and limits of the three historical eras outlined thus far.
Regional analysis indicates the pervasiveness of a three-stage periodization of the transition to adulthood. For much of the twentieth century different regions of the United States played host to diﬀerent economic and
demographic patterns (Heim 2000), and each setting shaped transitions to
adulthood. For instance, at the outset of the century, young men in the West
spent more than 40 years in transition to adulthood, whereas the ﬁgure never
rose above 30 in the North, South, or Midwest.6 Similarly, female combined spreads were especially prolonged in the West, likely a result of the
region’s still erratic economy, which attracted unmarried and unﬁxed young
people in disproportionate numbers. Despite such regional variations, the
pattern of generational change visible in the total population characterized
each individual region as well. At the outset of the century, young people
in each region prolonged their transitions to adulthood; they began status
changes many years before they would marry or create their own households.
By midcentury, the length of the transition to adulthood in all four regions
had dropped in unison, and spectacular falls in combined spread brought
western young people into accordance with the others. In 1960, the duration of the transition to adulthood ranged between 16 and 19 years for males
in all four regions and between 9 and 12 years for females. Prolonged transitions reemerged with similar synchrony. By 2000, the four regions were
remarkably alike: males spent 27 to 28 years in transition to adulthood in all
four regions, and females spent 22 to 24 years. Whatever forces encouraged
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Figure 4 Combined spread for African American males and females, 1900–2000
Source: See ﬁgure 1.

young peoples’ decisions, and whatever changes their choices wrought, they
occurred simultaneously across the nation.
In contrast, African American experiences illustrate the limits of the
three-era periodization. In response to the scarce opportunities available
to them, African Americans consistently delayed the transition to adulthood; as midcentury approached, the combined spreads of African Americans remained prolonged, and the diﬀerences between their spreads and
those of the rest of the population increased (ﬁgure 4).
Nonetheless, the combined spreads for African Americans were never
lower than in the decades after the Second World War. For them, the midcentury drop occurred suddenly. Whereas spreads in the total population
declined incrementally in the ﬁrst half of the century and then slowly rose
again, African Americans suddenly curtailed their transitions to adulthood at
midcentury and then rapidly increased their durations as 2000 approached.
In 1950, a decade prior to the drop, African American transitions were more
prolonged than at any time in the ﬁrst half of the century, and in the single
decade between 1980 and 1990, spreads climbed 11 years for males and 8 years
for females to unprecedented highs. These diﬀerences are crucial to under-
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standing African Americans’ experiences of the transition to adulthood and
will be explored at the end of the article.
Twentieth-century transitions to adulthood were never uniform. At the
outset of the century, the West played host to a distinctively prolonged transition, and diﬀerences in gender and race appear throughout the century.
Nonetheless, across regions and within separate demographic groups, three
distinct eras emerge. The explanation of this sweeping tendency and of the
distinct pattern of African American transitions to adulthood requires an
understanding of a broader historical setting.

Transitions to Adulthood in
Historical Context
We use the context of young people’s transitions to adulthood to explain why
and how the observed shifts occurred. At the same time, we hope to suggest the wider importance of family history. Transitions to adulthood point
toward an understanding of the twentieth century that emerges from the patterned choices of everyday Americans rather than from wars, political movements, or other historical events. The three eras outlined thus far now can
be explicitly named and elaborated: the era of reciprocity reached from 1900
to approximately 1950, the era of dependence went from about 1950 to the
mid-1970s, and the era of autonomy lasted from the mid-1970s to at least the
end of the century. Each era reﬂects connections that place the transition to
adulthood at the center of a social historical narrative of the century.

The Era of Reciprocity, 1900 to 1950
When the century began, young people made prolonged transitions to adulthood. Many remained ‘‘children,’’ living with their parents and hence dependent in the eyes of census enumerators, until well into their twenties. And
they were indeed reliant on the households they inhabited—most did not
have the resources to establish their own households. As it had in the late
nineteenth century, reliance also ran in the opposite direction (Chudacoﬀ and
Hareven 1978; Modell and Hareven 1978; Katz et al. 1982; Ruggles 1994).
Most households could not have survived without the work of people in transition to adulthood: households depended on the wages of young workers and
the rents of young boarders. The presence of multiple sources of income pro-
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vided households with a measure of ﬁnancial stability in a period when job
security was low, credit scarce, and budgets tight for most American families. Yet, the era of reciprocity was already unraveling. Even as it deﬁned
most transitions to adulthood, the household organization that sustained
reciprocity was giving way to families reliant on a single earner, with children who prolonged their time in school and shortened their transitions to
adulthood. Reciprocity ﬁt the shape of the labor force and the state at the
beginning of the century, but by the end of the period shifts in both presaged
the era to come.
Labor force dynamics in the ﬁrst half of the century encouraged reciprocal currents of reliance between households and people in transition to
adulthood. First, the limited participation of married women in the workforce elevated the value of youth labor. A good deal of income was provided
by young female workers, who reached their peak labor force participation in
their early twenties (Kessler-Harris 1982). At the same time, the wage structure within the male labor force placed young people in no position to start
their own households. In 1940, the mean income of male workers between
the ages of 25 and 29 was 68 percent of the wages of the highest earning older
workers, a ﬁgure that was already likely higher than it had been earlier in
the century. Male workers could expect their wages to rise steadily until the
age of 60, after which earnings declined rapidly.7 Thus, by remaining in the
households of older workers, younger men could build resources in two ways.
First, young people may have saved some money for starting a household.
Even in the absence of this direct accumulation, however, merely staying in
the workforce added to their wealth because as they grew older their incomes
increased. Delay of marriage and household headship meant that they could
attain the income necessary to support the kind of households that they envisioned. These two labor-force dynamics—age-based wage inequality and the
exclusion of married women from the workforce—persisted for the ﬁrst half
of the century and sustained the era of reciprocity.
Yet, important changes were underway: the exclusion of children from
the workforce, the invention of retirement, and government support of
single-family housing served to undermine the era of reciprocity. Latenineteenth- and early-twentieth-century corporations dramatically expanded
the scale and technology of business. As part of this process they systematized hiring and ﬁring and reduced their dependence on the work of children and the elderly (Chandler 1977; Goldin 2000; Osterman 1980: 53–62;

Transitions to Adulthood and the Social History of Twentieth-Century America

639

Graebner 1980). Children closed out of the labor market were steered into
schools. By 1920 the great majority of young people remained in school into
their late teens, a shift that shortened the transition to adulthood by delaying its onset. At the same time, the introduction of old-age pensions, ﬁrst
through the incremental increase of military and state pensions and then with
the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935, oﬀered older Americans ﬁnancial security and weakened their dependence on the wages of young workers
(Katz 1996: 185–222). Finally, the federal government’s commitment to consumption as a means of economic recovery spurred the creation in 1933 of the
Federal Housing Administration and the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation,
which, respectively, underwrote and oﬀered loans to homeowners ( Jackson
1985). Just as important, the New Deal Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation guaranteed
private investments. By the 1940s, Americans were saving some 20 percent of
their disposable income, as opposed to 3 percent in the 1920s (Cohen 2003:
71). While the full eﬀects of the expanding state would await the end of the
Second World War and the postwar boom in housing construction, already
in 1940, credit, and therefore independent home ownership, had been made
available to increasing numbers of young people. Between 1920 and 1940, the
age at which 90 percent of males headed their own households dropped from
41 to 36.
None of these trends aﬀected all Americans equally; in particular, African Americans stood out from the rest. Rather than following the downward
slope of the aggregate population, African American transitions to adulthood
remained prolonged throughout the era of reciprocity. Ongoing neglect of
African American schooling, a ‘‘truncated’’ social welfare system that never
oﬀered equitable service to African Americans, and the unique insecurity of
African American jobs delayed the process outlined above (Fass 1989; Grossman 1989; Katz 1996: 252–54; Brown 1999; Gordon et al. 1982). Between
1900 and 1950, young African Americans continued to leave school early in
order to work and maintained the reciprocal currents of reliance between
households and young laborers that characterized this era.

The Era of Dependence, 1950 to mid-1970s
By 1950, an extraordinary economic boom had joined the dynamics undermining reciprocity and had ushered in a new era of transitions to adulthood.
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Churning postwar industry issued a call for labor that, with immigration
restrictions still in place, could not be met by workers moving to the United
States from abroad. The spike in demand aided America’s lowest earners,
and the gap between the wages of young and old male workers narrowed. In
the same period, the Veteran Administration’s loan insurance complemented
the New Deal programs to facilitate mortgages and oﬀered young people a
unique opportunity to establish their own households. They seized it, and
in so doing deﬁned an era. At midcentury, transitional statuses all but disappeared. Young people made the most important decisions of youth—decisions about school, home, marriage, and work—while still living in dependence upon their parents.
During the era of dependence almost everyone was earning more than
before. With more than a third of the workforce unionized for the ﬁrst, and
last, time in the century and the reserve of unemployed labor dwindling,
workers made signiﬁcant gains. Between 1947 and 1966, real hourly earnings increased 2.1 percent every year. By 1966, this meant that workers could
expect real wages 50 percent higher than those of their peers 19 years earlier
(Goldin 2000; Freeman 1980). Young males shared disproportionately in the
rise in fortune. The mean earnings of men between the ages of 25 and 29 rose
to 79 percent of the highest salaries by 1950.8 Although this ﬁgure declined in
the next two censuses, the disproportionate rise in the incomes of young men
in an era of increased prosperity encouraged a new approach to the transition
to adulthood.
Young women did not share directly in this prosperity. Their wages
remained relatively low and steady throughout the era of dependence. Accordingly, their best opportunity to share in the wealth of their young male
counterparts was to marry. If they used their parents’ generation as a measure of the economic standing necessary to form a household, young men and
women suddenly found that they could marry and get a place of their own
at far younger ages than had been the case earlier in the century (Easterlin
1968, 1980).
The newfound wealth of young couples quickened the transition to
adulthood with the help of government policy. As previous scholars have
suggested, the ﬁrst signiﬁcant government intervention in the transition to
adulthood in this period was military service; service in World War II and
Vietnam brought many young people out of their parents’ homes before
they otherwise might have found self-supporting civilian employment. Upon
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return from service, however, GIs took advantage of the student loans and
stipends accorded by the 1944 GI Bill of Rights to extend their educations
(Hogan 1981; Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1999; Gutmann et al. 2002;
Modell 1989). Ultimately, the GI Bill, along with the long-standing trend
toward prolonged education, shortened the transition to adulthood by delaying its onset. In 1950, for the ﬁrst time in the century, leaving school was not
the ﬁrst transition crossed by 10 percent of young people. Instead, the entry
of 10 percent of young people into the workforce in their midteens began the
transition to adulthood.
Government programs speciﬁcally promoting new households also compressed the transition to adulthood. In the immediate postwar era, the federal government aimed to make good on the widespread promise of homes as
rewards for wartime sacriﬁces (Cohen 2003: 194–256). Most often, federal aid
was provided indirectly. Private banks and savings and loan associations put
Americans’ buoyed savings of the 1940s to use as mortgages that were underwritten by the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration. In a city such as Philadelphia, this inﬂuence was felt rapidly. A 1951
survey of 800 home purchases in that city found that 84 percent involved a
mortgage insured by one of the two federal agencies (Philadelphia Board of
Realtors 1951: 18–19). Increased earnings, abundant new housing, and guaranteed savings and loans made the golden era of American industry especially lustrous for young couples looking to establish their own households.
The home ownership rates of American household heads in their late thirties
soared from 32 to 65 percent between 1940 and 1960.9 Suddenly, the entire
transition to adulthood was compressed between the relatively advanced age
at which young people entered the workforce and the relatively young age at
which they could aﬀord their own houses.
Just as prosperity made the leap from dependence to adulthood possible
for most Americans, the economic advances of African Americans allowed
them to shorten their transitions to adulthood. African Americans had passed
slowly into adulthood throughout the era of reciprocity, but in the postwar
era they quickly reduced the number of years spent in transition. The sudden fall in the duration of African American transitions to adulthood followed partly from improvements to African American education and partly
from a rise in prosperity. Generations of civil rights activism came to fruition
in a series of postwar legal decisions, including the famous Brown v. Board
of Education in 1954, which ushered in an era of reform of African Ameri-
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can education (Anderson 1988; Patterson 2001; Kantor and Brenzel 1993).
These reforms, though incomplete, saw the age at which 10 percent of African Americans left school rise to 16 by 1970, as opposed to 13 for males and 12
for females in 1940. At the same time, increased earnings lowered the age at
which African Americans could establish their own households. Whereas in
1940 African Americans earned 43 percent of their white peers’ income, this
ﬁgure rose to 58 percent by 1960 and peaked at 73 percent in 1980 (Goldin
2000: 606). Increased prosperity meant that households headed by older African Americans found themselves less in need of the fruits of young labor, and
young people found themselves more able to establish their own households.
Yet persistent inequality, both in the labor and housing markets, meant
that African American transitions to adulthood remained prolonged in comparison to those of the rest of the population ( Jackson 1985; Sugrue 1996;
Hillier 2001). Despite their dramatic gains during the postwar period, by
1970, only 42 percent of African American families owned their homes, a
ﬁgure that was 20 percentage points behind the aggregate population (Cohen
2003: 222). Ongoing disparities would come to matter a great deal in the
ﬁnal era of transitions to adulthood. Although the quick leap from childhood to adulthood faded as a deﬁnitive American experience and the transition to adulthood ceased to take place in a context of dependence on parents,
inequality continued to ensure that diﬀerent people became adults diﬀerently.
In the middle decades of the century, young households were not only
the beneﬁciaries of economic growth; they also were its engine. Especially
in the 1950s, early household formation and the ensuing baby boom created
consumer demands that supported the labor of young workers. In previous
boom times, immigrants had played a similar role—buoying demand even
as they supplied labor. In the unusual midcentury period, young Americans
assumed this dual position as they leapt from dependence to adulthood (Easterlin 1968).

The Era of Autonomy, mid-1970s . . .
In the period after the mid-1970s, the unusual conﬂuence that had animated the previous quarter century came to an end. The structure of the
labor force shifted once again to delay the transition to adulthood, and the
cost of housing rose. Young people delayed in transition to adulthood, but
unlike their early-century peers, they spent the period between childhood
and adulthood in relative autonomy from their parents. This contrast was
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especially strong for females, who found new opportunities in higher education and the workforce.
Young people’s relative earnings dropped quickly in the era of autonomy.
By 1980 male workers between the ages of 25 and 29 earned only 63 percent
of the wages of the highest earning males, and by the end of the century they
earned just over half the wages of the older group.10 This did not mean that
young people were poorer, in absolute terms, in 2000 than they had been in
1940—instead, the real earnings of young males more than doubled in this
period.11 However, relative to older workers, and in comparison with what
they could expect to earn as they aged, young men in the era of autonomy
were poorer than they had been for more than 60 years. Once again they
had good reason to prolong the transition to adulthood as they built ﬁnancial
resources (Easterlin 1980).
Rising real costs of housing encouraged this delay. Whereas in the era of
dependence the mean value of housing in the United States totaled between
three and four times the average annual income of males in their twenties,
by 1990 the cost of housing had risen to six times young males’ earnings.12
Alongside the rising costs of housing, federal cutbacks of aid to young home
purchasers made housing once again an elusive commodity. No new body
replaced the Veterans Administration with loans speciﬁcally targeting young
people; youthful purchasers were forced to generate their own credit. Even
had they known whom and what they wanted to be, young people were now
required to delay the transition to adulthood in search of housing.
The loss of economic opportunity produced a transition to adulthood
that was characterized by autonomy. Rather than spending their youths in
reciprocal reliance with their parents or leaping from childhood to adulthood
in a state of dependence, young Americans now spent the transition to adulthood in school and at work pursuing their own interests and needs.With more
married women working and the ﬁnancial security of the elderly still ensured
by the federal state, young people were no longer central to the economic
well-being of their parents. However, young people lacked the resources, and
often the impetus, to immediately begin their own procreative households.
Instead, attaining personal independence from their parents without marrying became a centerpiece of transitions to adulthood. Portions of the transition to adulthood often were spent in nonfamily households, but a good
number of young people spent this period living with their parents, either
because they had never left home or because they returned home after a spell
of living on their own. Such young people both depended on their parents’
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households and contributed to them, but they should not be confused with
young people living at home in earlier eras. Their workforce participation
distinguished them from young people in the era of dependence, and their
prolonged schooling as well as their independent interests and spending set
them apart from their peers in the era of reciprocity (Mortimer et al. 1999;
Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1993).
Women’s workforce participation and remuneration changed dramatically in the era of autonomy, partly as a result of their extended schooling. As
late as 1970, 90 percent of females left school by the age of 23, a ﬁgure that
would not be reached by women in 2000 until the age of 35. Females’ incomes
continued to lag behind those of their male peers across the life span, but the
earnings of young workers suggested the beneﬁts of prolonged female education. Already in 1990, females 25–29 years of age earned a mean income
88 percent as high as males their age, a ﬁgure that had risen from 54 percent
in 1960.13 As they earned more, women stayed in the workforce longer. They
began to enter the workforce in their late teens, their workforce entry rates
peaked by their early twenties, and they maintained high levels of workforce
participation even after marriage. Remaining in school gave women reason
to delay marriage, as did pursuit of long-term careers. Females’ increased
independence deﬁned the last period of transition to adulthood.
The dramatic rise in the duration of African American transitions to
adulthood in the last decades of the century far outpaced the changes within
the aggregate population. This jump is largely attributable to declining
African American prosperity. Although many African Americans remained
in school for longer durations than their predecessors, economic improvement proved illusory. Some African Americans had reached higher economic
strata, but commitment to African American schooling waned, and persistent
racial bias in the housing and labor markets left African Americans increasingly concentrated in impoverished, isolated, and segregated urban ghettos (Goldin 2000: 606; James 1989; Kantor and Brenzel 1993; Orﬁeld and
Eaton 1996; Massey and Denton 1993; Oliver and Shapiro 1995). More than
any of their peers, young African Americans faced a context in which the
housing and jobs suﬃcient to start a household were simply unavailable (Hill
and Yeung 1999). In response, they greatly delayed establishing their own
households.
The three eras of transition to adulthood—characterized by reciprocity,
dependence, and then autonomy—are connected to one another and distinct;
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their members were diverse, but they responded to similar pressures. Each
era of transition provided a mixed experience for young people.While the era
of dependence, when young people leapt into adulthood, was made possible
by opportunities in the housing market and the workforce, a prolonged transition to adulthood represents a greater degree of freedom to delay, weigh,
and study before making a series of life-altering choices. Indeed, the dramatic
shifts outlined here serve to undermine a normative understanding of the
transition to adulthood and to point, instead, to its deeply historical dynamics. The decisions of youth in transition to adulthood reﬂect crucial social
historical shifts that took place during the twentieth century. As generations
of youth reinvented their transitions to adulthood, they also told us a great
deal about how the world around them had changed.

Notes
This article grew out of research for America at the Millennium, a collaborative project
headed by Michael B. Katz and Mark J. Stern and funded by the Russell Sage Foundation. The authors owe a great deal of thanks to Michael B. Katz as well as to Leah Gordon,
Domenic Vitiello, Julia Rabig, Peter Siskind, Ilana Stanger-Ross, and Michael, Hildy, and
Ilana Ross for their comments. Thanks also to Katherine A. Lynch and the anonymous
reviewers for Social Science History, who greatly improved this essay.
1
Data are derived from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the
United States (Ruggles and Sobek 2003).
2
For a useful review of recent scholarship, see Shanahan 2000.
3
The value in the example case, 0.67, indicates that for two-thirds of their spreads the
two status changes overlapped. The ﬁgure might, in an absolute sense, be considered
high. However, in this paper ‘‘high’’ and ‘‘low’’ are viewed in largely comparative
terms; this congruence ﬁgure is higher than most.
4
Lambda, a proportional reduction of error statistic, measures the extent to which
knowledge of one variable improves the odds of predicting the other variable correctly. Because the variables used are all dichotomous (left school/did not leave
school, etc.), these tests have no ‘‘ties’’ in prediction, a situation which often confuses the interpretation of measures of association. As with congruence, we evaluate
levels of integration by comparing across censuses.
5
As noted above, our measures fail to capture ‘‘backward’’ movement for all of the
status changes; in instances other than women’s workforce participation, this deﬁciency does not provide grounds for abandoning analysis. However, by smoothing
the edges of a rough process, we slightly skew spread and congruence measures; the
backward ﬂows postpone the ages at which we report that 10 or 90 percent of individuals have passed status changes. The similarity of this eﬀect at either end of the
spread leaves its overall impact on our measures ambiguous.
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These ﬁgures refer to the combined spread in each of the four regions. The regions
North, South, Midwest, and West are derived from the 1990 census classiﬁcations:
Region H33–34 (Ruggles and Sobek 2003).
Authors’ calculations based on Ruggles and Sobek 2003. Unfortunately, income variables begin in the 1940 census, so these ﬁgures cannot be cited for earlier dates. However, economic historians generally agree that the earnings of young people in the
prewar period were a good deal lower than those of older workers; see Denison 1985:
tables 3–5.
Authors’ calculations based on Ruggles and Sobek 2003.
Authors’ calculations based on Ruggles and Sobek 2003.
Authors’ calculations based on Ruggles and Sobek 2003. For extensive discussion of
the economic diﬀerential between young men in the era of dependence and the era
of autonomy, see Bernhardt et al. 2001.
Authors’ calculations based on Ruggles and Sobek 2003. In the last generations
of the century, young women’s earnings also made crucial contributions to household economies. However, a comparison of young and old workers is less useful
for females because of the generational changes in female workforce participation
described above.
Authors’ calculations based on Ruggles and Sobek 2003.
Authors’ calculations based on Ruggles and Sobek 2003.
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